

MR LAMB  
C-SPAN.

Mountain View, CA 94040

415 961-5614

Dear Sir:

I watched your interview of Peter MacDonal on GIAP - and have some comments since I have had considerable experience in this area of military logistics. In 1961-67, I commanded a U.S. Army Special Forces unit of 50 officers, 200 enlisted men - with operational deployment to S. Vietnam, Laos, Thailand etc.

Mr MacDonal has recounted a good deal of history.

He failed to mention that the Labor government in Britain was strongly opposed to our venture into Vietnam. One of our biggest problems was that a considerable part of the bulk war supplies going to N. Vietnam from the Soviet Union in the 70's was being shipped on chartered British vessels. This tactic "guaranteed" that the shipments would get past the U.S. Navy and if the ports were bombed (as they were) the U.S. would give the British ample warning.

With in the context of conflicts, the GIAP Tet offensive of 1968, ~~was~~ has been considered one of the greatest military blunders of this century. I refer you to exhaustive interviews of



the highest North Vietnamese officers/officers  
 conducted by U.S. TV newsmen during the 1985  
 celebration of the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the N. Vietnamese  
 "victory." The Viet Cong suffer 80% casualties, are  
 killed, wounded and captured (a military debacle  
 imposed most by the South Vietnamese Army). The  
 US was finally given the opportunity to use its  
 superior communications/mobility to bring force and  
 fire power to bear on lucrative tactical target. Cut took  
 the N. Vietnamese regular 1 1/2 years to ~~recomp~~ re-comp  
 their loss before they could launch large scale attacks.

Mac Donald "FORGOT" to mention that  
 President Truman had 2200 US personnel (some were  
 my friends) advising and assist the French in  
 Vietnam in the mid 50's and that we were providing  
 95% of the military supplies/weapon.


The CIA "Victory" was due to the  
 inept civilian leadership in Washington  
 in their failure to use strategic Navy/Air Force  
 assets to defeat N. Vietnam. Just the  
 destruction of the main levees of the Delta  
 would have inundated almost 20% of the  
 country and damage 1/2 of its agricultural  
 production. The President Kennedy "neutralization"



(surrender - may 30 US Army Special Forces men were withdrawn in April (may 1962) was the first major defeat - the 2nd major defeat was the assassination of Diem, when the resulting chaos (1/2 the Army went AWOL) gave G.I.P. the opening to commit the North Vietnamese regulars. The inordinate fear by American civilians leading "what the Russians/Chinese would do" was an overwhelming reason for failure (The Reagan foreign policy successes were due to refusal to be hampered by the Russian threats/~~possible threats~~ threats.



P.S. My resolution in 1966 was tell the Soviet Union that they had 60 days to get their 15000 advisors and SAM missile units and all supply operation out of the area in Vietnam - or suffer the consequence that we would invade Cuba. China would be told we had 6 missile carrying submarines in position if they moved into Vietnam. Unfortunately LBJ was taken by JFK's "best and the brightest" thinkers.








The President of the United States of America, authorized by Act of Congress, July 20, 1942, has awarded the Legion of Merit to

LIEUTENANT COLONEL [REDACTED] U S A

for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services:

Lieutenant Colonel [REDACTED] Infantry, distinguished himself by exceptionally meritorious service while serving in a position of responsibility as Chief of the Doctrine and Organization Division, United States Army Combat Developments Command Special Warfare Agency, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, during the period December 1963 to June 1966. Colonel [REDACTED] keen perception, objectivity, and perseverance led to marked advancements in the program of the United States Army Combat Developments Command Special Warfare Agency. He discovered many voids in concepts and doctrine in the areas of counterinsurgency, psychological operations, and unconventional warfare. Through his determination and well-calculated planning, he insured that all draft field manuals were reviewed by his division. As a result of his successful effort, one hundred draft field manuals were reviewed, and recommended doctrine on counterinsurgency, psychological operations, and unconventional warfare was provided for each. Through his decisive leadership, professional acumen, and steadfast devotion to duty, he contributed in great measure to the development of more meaningful strategic and tactical doctrine and to the readiness posture of the armed forces of his country. Colonel [REDACTED] distinguished performance of duty throughout this period represents outstanding achievement in the finest traditions of the United States Army and reflects the utmost credit upon himself and the military service.



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