

✓ CC: S. Trahern
(enclosed information was
passed along to Sarah)

[REDACTED]
Simsbury, Connecticut 06070
December 1, 1990

C-SPAN\C-SPAN II
400 North Capitol Street, N.W.
Suite 412
Washington, D.C. 20001

postcard

Dear Sir :

Ambassador Ronald Lehman, Director of the
ment Agency, was on the 8 a.m. CALL-IN SHOW on
27th.

isarma-
nber

I was fortunate to get through with a ques
I must admit, I was not too surprised when the
am writing to you to see if there is anything y
information given out by official guests repre
especially when it comes to nuclear arms control

d).

or. I

ation,

The Administration has decided that, for the foreseeable future, it does
not want a nuclear test ban treaty. This is their prerogative, but it is
wrong to back this decision with technically false information. It seems to
me there should be some accountability as to the truthfulness of answers given
to television audiences, especially in technical matters concerning arms
control issues.

FEB 5 ANSD

As soon as the caller has asked his or her question, they are cut off and
there is no chance for a rebuttal. If your program is to achieve any depth on
the important matters it addresses, there must be a chance for rebuttal. At
the very least, the interviewer should know enough about the subject under
discussion to know when to solicit a broader response from the guest.

There are many experts in the fields of test ban verification and
reasons for testing. I have written a few in the hopes they will send you
some background material. In the mean time, I have enclosed some material for
your files you may want to give the interviewer before another program dis-
cussing nuclear arms control issues.

Thank you for any attention you can give this matter.

Sincerely yours,

[REDACTED]
Press Liaison for the United Nations
Non-Governmental Organizations
Committee on Disarmament

✓ CC: S. Trahern
(enclosed information was
passed along to Sarah)

[REDACTED]
Simsbury, Connecticut 06070
December 1, 1990

C-SPAN\C-SPAN II
400 North Capitol Street, N.W.
Suite 412
Washington, D.C. 20001

004481 DEC 17 90

Dear Sir :

Ambassador Ronald Lehman, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, was on the 8 a.m. CALL-IN SHOW on C-Span on Tuesday, November 27th.

I was fortunate to get through with a question (please see attached). I must admit, I was not too surprised when the answer I got lacked candor. I am writing to you to see if there is anything you can do to broaden the information given out by official guests representing the U.S. Administration, especially when it comes to nuclear arms control issues.

The Administration has decided that, for the foreseeable future, it does not want a nuclear test ban treaty. This is their prerogative, but it is wrong to back this decision with technically false information. It seems to me there should be some accountability as to the truthfulness of answers given to television audiences, especially in technical matters concerning arms control issues.

As soon as the caller has asked his or her question, they are cut off and there is no chance for a rebuttal. If your program is to achieve any depth on the important matters it addresses, there must be a chance for rebuttal. At the very least, the interviewer should know enough about the subject under discussion to know when to solicit a broader response from the guest.

There are many experts in the fields of test ban verification and reasons for testing. I have written a few in the hopes they will send you some background material. In the mean time, I have enclosed some material for your files you may want to give the interviewer before another program discussing nuclear arms control issues.

Thank you for any attention you can give this matter.

Sincerely yours,

[REDACTED]
Press Liaison for the United Nations
Non-Governmental Organizations
Committee on Disarmament

Enclosed :

My question and a summary of Ambassador Lehman's answer

Office of Technology Assessment Report on Seismic Verification of Nuclear Testing Treaties

1985 letter on reliability testing to Rep. Fascell, Chairman, House Committee on Foreign Affairs

Letter from Dr. Hugh E. DeWitt, Physics Department., Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

"Stopping the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" by David Albright and Tom Zamora. Federation of Atomic Scientists Public Interest Report, Sept., 1990.

"White Paper on Nuclear Testing" U.S. C.T.B. Coalition.
Arms Control Today : CTB Special Issue November, 1990

My question:

"A country wanting to build a nuclear arsenal, deliverable by missiles, must test nuclear devices many times. It is now possible to detect and identify underground nuclear tests. Therefore it is possible to conclude a verifiable treaty banning nuclear testing throughout the world thereby stopping the proliferation of missile-deliverable nuclear warhead arsenals to second and third world nations. Yet the United States -- and the United Kingdom, who tests in the U.S. and who must go along with our decision on this -- are the only countries now blocking negotiations that could lead to the conclusion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. How can this Administration say it is opposed to proliferation when it takes this stance?"

Ambassador Lehman's answer :

First the Ambassador made certain the audience understood that crude nuclear weapons can be acquired without testing. (This is correct and a test ban will not prevent countries from acquiring such weapons. However, my question referred to the prevention of proliferation of credible nuclear arsenals which can knock out another country's military installations. I think the Ambassador could have guessed from the way I phrased my question that that was what I meant.)

The Ambassador added :

There is some question as to whether or not a nation could build a nuclear arsenal, deliverable by missile, without testing. (I would submit that a nuclear deterrent, deliverable by missile, would need some testing, unless, as in the case of Israel, information and expertise is passed on to a country directly.)

A nuclear test ban is not verifiable... In many cases we cannot differentiate between a nuclear test and an earthquake. (This is incorrect. Please see the U. S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment report. It is true: tests below a certain limit (one to five kilotons) are not always distinguishable from

earthquake seismic signals. A nation testing to acquire light but lethal (tritium boosted) warheads for accurate, long distance trajectories will need to test over 5 kilotons to gain this capability. This was the type of testing to which I referred.)

For as long as we are dependent on a nuclear deterrent we need to test for reliability. (This is incorrect. Warhead designs that were thoroughly tested at the outset do not have to be tested again. Trigger mechanisms etc. can be tested without exploding the bomb. Please see enclosed letters from prominent nuclear physicists.)

4. For the above reasons, nuclear weapons nations want to continue testing. (This is extremely misleading. The Soviet Union has made it clear since its 1985 moratorium that it wants to stop testing. The Soviet citizens have been able, under Glasnost, to stop testing in South Central Asia. President Mitterand of France has said France would stop if we do. (Please see White Paper on Nuclear Testing, pg. 3 : What about France and China?) Other nations may be gently coerced to support the U.S. veto of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Amendment Conference at the U.N. this January. However, most have made it quite clear that they feel a test ban would go a long way in stemming proliferation.)

Finally, please note: Ambassador Lehman gave no direct answer to my question about proliferation. Here, it seems, the interviewer could have driven home my question by a follow-up question, such as: "But would ending testing prevent other countries from building nuclear arsenals deliverable anywhere in the world by missile?".....

The Administration pretends it is concerned about proliferation but, as was pointed out in recent Senate Foreign Relations Hearings on Iraq's nuclear capability, President Bush has actually blocked many attempts by Congress to have stricter national and international export laws preventing the spread of nuclear weapons capability and highly enriched uranium to research reactors abroad.

